Abstract. In 2000 more companies listed in Europe than in the US. This is mainly due to the success of 'new' stock markets designed for high-growth companies. In this paper we analyse a sample of 482 Initial Public Offerings (IPOs), listed on five 'new' European stock markets up to March 2001. We investigate the determinants of their first-day returns. We find a mean first-day return (underpricing) equal to +38.09%. Market returns, the IPO firm's risk and price revisions in the premarket are positively related to first-day returns, whereas IPO deal flow shows is inversely related to underpricing. We also show that the Internet euphoria impacts first-day returns.
Introduction
In 2000 more companies listed on European stock exchanges than in the United States. From January to December the NYSE and the NASDAQ hosted 445 IPOs, while in Europe over 500 companies went public. The increased interest in going public is largely due to the success of 'new' European stock markets designed for high-growth and high-tech fledgling companies.
These new markets have recently been established around Europe: the French Nouveau Marché (1996) , the German Neuer Markt (1997), Euro.NM Belgium (1997) , the Dutch NMAX (1997) and the Italian Nuovo Mercato (1999).
These new stock markets meet the expectations of the European Commission that has long been eager to copy the success of financing high-tech and 'new economy' enterprises in the United States (European Commission, 1996) . Such well-developed stock markets dedicated to high-growth firms are believed to be instrumental in creating economic growth, technological innovation and jobs. Subrahmanyam and Titman (1999) provide theoretical support for this belief and show how jump-starting an economy's stock market can indeed improve economic efficiency. Vibrant stock markets may also increase the amount of venture capital funding available to finance young and start-up companies in an economy (Jeng and Wells, 2000; Black and Gilson, 1998) . New European stock markets are therefore of interest to both economists and policymakers.
In this study we focus on the pricing of IPOs on five new European stock markets. It is widely documented that companies that go public sell their shares at an offer price that is lower than the first-day closing market price. This positive first-day offer-to-close return is commonly known as underpricing. Several recent studies have investigated the underpricing phenomenon for Initial Public Offerings (IPOs) on the main European stock exchanges. Ljungqvist (1997) reports an average underpricing equal to +9.2% for German IPOs from 1970 to 1993 . Derrien and Womack (2000 document +9.5% underpricing in France from 1992 to 1998. Giudici and Paleari (2001) find that 164 Italian IPOs from 1985 to 2000 are underpriced by +23.9%, on balance. These numbers pale in comparison to the average first-day return of +38.1% of IPOs on new European stock markets we report in this study.
This prompts the question what explains the significant underpricing of IPOs on new
European stock markets. The existing literature suggests several explanations. Companies that go public on the new stock markets tend to operate in risky entrepreneurial sectors, most notably the Internet. The information asymmetry between the issuing firm and investors is large. As a result, pricing the shares of these firms becomes more difficult and investors require underpricing to compensate them for the higher valuation uncertainty.
Alternatively, underpricing may serve to compensate investors for their release of private information during the bookbuilding process. The book building process starts with the publication of a preliminary prospectus containing a price range for the shares. The investment bank solicits non-binding bids from institutional investors in the premarket. After gauging investors' demand in the premarket phase, the final offer price is determined. In order to reward investors for their information, underwriters only partially incorporate collected private information in the final offer price. As investors pay a lower offer price than the full information price in the secondary market, they pocket high first-day returns (Benveniste and Spindt, 1989 returns and focus on the IPO price revisions in the premarket. These price revisions are measured as the percentage revision of the offer price from the midpoint of the file price range.
We find that favourable private information released by institutional investors during the premarket phase of the bookbuilding procedure (as reflected in a greater price revision) is positively related to underpricing. We also find that first-day returns are correlated with public information available at the listing (i.e. the market returns), the IPO firm's risk and the IPO deal flow (i.e. the number of IPOs brought to the market from 60 before to 10 trading days after the IPO date). Consistent with the Internet hype documented in the United States, we report that Internet IPOs are more underpriced than non-Internet IPOs. Interestingly, we document marketspecific determinants of first-day returns.
In section two, we continue with an overview of the extant literature. In section three we describe the sample and summary statistics. In section four we provide the empirical results and in section five we present our conclusions.
Review of the literature
Pricing IPOs is a difficult task: the market is not certain about the quality of the IPO firm, while the issuing firm and its underwriter do not know the market demand for IPO shares. The disclosure of information is crucial in order to avoid mispricing. The problem facing an underwriter wanting to collect information useful to pricing an IPO is that investors have no reason to truthfully reveal their private information during the premarket phase.
Benveniste and Spindt (1989) show that, in order to induce investors to truthfully reveal their demand for IPO shares, they must be rewarded with more underpricing on deals for which there is strong demand. At the outset of the bookbuilding process, the underwriter proposes a 
Data and Sample Description
We consider a sample of 482 IPOs on five European stock markets for high-growth firms (the [Please insert Table 1 about here]
The minimum book value of the equity is generally equal to 1.5 million euro. The Euro.NM Belgium and the Neuer Markt require a minimum age equal to three years, while one year old companies may list on the other markets. Companies with losses, but with an ambitious business plan and relevant growth opportunities qualify for listing on all new stock markets. The capital sold to the public must represent 20%/25% of the total equity, albeit in some cases exceptions are tolerated. All markets require that at least 50% of the IPO shares must be newly issued. This should boost IPO firms to make new investments and grow. Lock-up provisions, that prevent insiders from selling their shares immediately after the IPO, have to be implemented in most markets. [Please insert Table 3 about here]
It is interesting to note that the mean market capitalization and offer size are significantly larger than the book value of total assets. The average company has a market capitalization that is more than 120 times its operating cash flow. Over 25% of the companies have no (or negative) operating cash flow. The IPO thus represents an important source of capital, allowing the company to fund its future growth plans. The mean company age is equal to 12 years. This differs from previous studies of IPOs on European main exchanges (e.g., Pagano, Panetta and Zingales, 1996) , that show European IPO firms to be mature and established companies.
The mean initial underpricing is equal to +38.09%, which is remarkably high if compared to first-day returns on the main stock exchanges in Europe during the same period, as reported by Ljungqvist (1997), Derrien and Womack (2000) and Giudici and Paleari (2001) . Yet, more than 25% of the sample IPOs does not display underpricing, or are initially overpriced (i.e.
experience a negative first-day return).
We plot the monthly number of IPOs and the mean initial underpricing per month in Almost all IPOs (466; 96.7%) have been priced using the book building procedure, while in 13 cases the final offer price was fixed in the prospectus and in 3 cases the IPO was auctioned.
Considering 464 IPOs in which the final offer price is not fixed, we find that on the average the final offer price is revised upwards (+3.573%) with respect to the midpoint price of the file range 2 . Yet, no revision or downward revision with respect to the midpoint price is found in about 25% of the IPOs. Table 4 investigates any cross-market differences. We record several marked differences among the three major markets (Nouveau Marché, Neuer Markt and Nuovo Mercato).
[Please insert Table 4 about here]
The German Neuer Markt leads the other markets with regard to offer size, IPO price volatility, underpricing, and percentage price revision. The French Nouveau Marché hosts smaller and less underpriced IPOs. The Italian Nuovo Mercato heads the other markets with regard to market capitalization and operating cash flow. No differences are found concerning company age. In the next section we will investigate the effect of both cross-country and firm-specific characteristics on the first-day returns.
Empirical Results
In this section we study the determinants of the first-day returns of IPOs on new European stock markets. In comparison to companies going public on the main European stock exchanges, IPOs on new stock markets are younger and smaller and operate in high-tech and fast-growing innovative sectors. Therefore, information asymmetries should be particularly large and it becomes more difficult to price the shares of these firms. Moreover, it is interesting to investigate whether market-specific determinants are at work.
We investigate whether the market index return in the 50 days prior to the IPO influences first-day returns. We measure the index return by the MSCI Index of the country of listing (France, Germany, the Netherlands, Belgium or Italy). As argued earlier, the Benveniste and Spindt (1989) model does not predict that there is partial adjustment to public information, such as market returns. Instead public information should be fully incorporated into the final offer price. According to theory, market returns should therefore not able to explain first-day returns.
We expect that investors require higher first-day returns to compensate them for the higher valuation uncertainty associated with risky deals. Market-adjusted volatility is used as a proxy for company risk. It is computed as the standard deviation of the firm's daily stock returns during the 60 trading day interval of 20 to 80 days after its IPO date minus the standard deviation of daily returns to the MSCI index of the country of listing during that same period 3 .
We examine whether IPO deal flow affects first-day returns. Several studies (HoffmannBurchardi, 2001; Loughran, Ritter and Rydqvist, 1994) show that IPO markets are subject to cycles, with 'hot' issue periods, that are characterised by high volume of IPOs and/or high firstday returns, alternating with 'cold' issue periods. The transition from hot to cold periods is marked by heavy volume periods in which the number of IPOs is increasing, but the typical firstday return is lower. Figure 1 reinforces the occurrence of IPO cycles during our sample period. In accordance with the model of Benveniste and Spindt (1989) we hypothesise that the revision of the offer price is positively related to underpricing. Benveniste and Spindt (1989) argue that, in order to reward investors for their private information, underwriters only partially incorporate collected private information in the final offer price. The more valuable the private information is to pricing the IPO, reflected in a greater price revision, the higher first-day returns. We measure the percentage revision of the final offer price from the midpoint of the price range.
We also include four control variables in the regression models. We include the log of the book value of total assets to control for differences in size. We include company age to control for age differences. To control for differences between the national exchanges, we incorporate two dummy variables for Neuer Markt and Nouveau Marché, respectively. Table 5 reports the results of the regression analyses.
[Please insert Table 5 about here]
We first consider the empirical results for the full sample of 482 IPOs as shown in the first column of Table 5 . The market index returns during the 50 days prior to the IPO is significantly related to first-day returns. A one percentage point increase in the market results (e.g. from 4%
to 5%) results in a first-day return which is 2.4 percent higher. This suggests that underwriters do In the second column of Table 5 we consider 464 IPOs for which price revisions are available. We find that the price revision is significantly related to underpricing. This is A 10 percentage point increase in price revision results in a first-day return that is about 9 percentage points higher. This suggests that investors are rewarded by higher first-day returns in exchange for their revelation of positive private information in the bookbuilding process.
We run separate regressions for the three major exchanges to investigate whether the determinants of underpricing are different across markets. The market momentum is informative only in Germany, while the IPO valuation uncertainty (proxied by the volatility) is an important determinant of underpricing in France. These differences may be related to different institutional settings. For example, in France in recent cases the final offer price is set at the listing and must be in the initial price range. If the final offer price is not in the range, orders are cancelled and a new subscription period opens with a new range. This is not the case of Germany, allowing the first-day returns to be higher on the Neuer Markt. Because of these institutional differences, In additional tests we investigate whether underwriters respond differently to negative and positive information learned during the premarket phase of the bookbuilding procedure.
Lowry and Schwert (2001) argue that negative information learned during the premarket is more fully incorporated into the final offer price than positive information since investors and underwriters want to avoid losses on overpriced issues (i.e. they want to avoid buying issues with negative first-day returns). We re-estimate the regressions with an additional explanatory variable that equals the price revision if it is positive and zero otherwise. The coefficient of this variable should be significantly positive if underwriters price in positive information less fully than negative information. However, in unreported tests we do not find any evidence that underwriters incorporate positive information less fully than negative information. The coefficient equals 0.997 (t-statistic = 0.793).
Conclusions
This study contributes to literature on the pricing of IPOs, which is thus far dominated by U.S.
studies. We verify that, in contrast to the evidence of main European exchanges, new markets attract young and high technology firms. We show that an average IPO on the new markets displays a +38.09% first-day return, about three times larger than the first-day return of a typical IPO on the main European stock exchanges. We find that several determinants explain the high first-day returns of IPOs on new stock markets.
First, in contrast to the Benveniste and Spindt (1989) model, public information is not fully incorporated into the final offer price. This yields a positive association between market returns (our proxy for public information) and first-day returns. Second, we find that the IPO firm's risk is positively related to underpricing. Investors seem to demand higher first-day returns to compensate them for the higher valuation uncertainty associated with risky deals.
Third, the IPO deal flow is inversely related to first-day returns. Companies that go public in a period of high IPO volume have lower first-day returns. In high IPO volume periods, the market power of underwriters may be stronger, reducing the need to compensate investors for the release of private information by means of high first-day returns. Alternatively, this result may capture the transition of a 'hot' to a 'cold' issue market, that is normally associated with an increase in the number of firms going public and a decline in the average first-day returns. a Internet companies are identified after careful reading of each firm's business description as published in the prospectus b Non-internet companies assigned SIC codes starting with 737 (computer programming, data processing and other computer related services) c Non-internet companies assigned SIC codes starting with 357 (computer and office equipment), 36 (electronic and other electrical equipment) or 38 (not 384, measuring, analyzing and controlling instruments) d Non-internet companies assigned SIC codes starting with 283 (drugs), 384 (surgical, medical and dental instruments and supplies), 80 (health services) or assigned SIC code 8731 (commercial physical and biological research) e Non-internet companies assigned SIC codes starting with 73 (business services, not 737), 87 (engineering, accounting, research and management services) or 89 (services, not elsewhere classified) f Non-internet companies assigned SIC codes starting with 27 (printing and publishing), 78 (motion pictures), 79 (amusement and recreation services) g Non-internet companies assigned SIC codes starting with 20 (food and kindred products), 23 (apparel and textile products), 24 (lumber and wood products), 28 (chemicals and allied products, not 283), 30 (rubber and plastics products), 32 (stone, glass, and concrete products), 33 (primary metal industries), 34 (fabricated metal products), 35 (industrial and commercial machinery, not 357) or 37 (transportation equipment manufacturing) h Non-internet companies assigned SIC codes starting with 5 (wholesale and retial trade) i Non-internet companies assigned SIC codes starting with 48 (communications) M a y -9 6 J u l -9 6 S e p -9 6 N o v -9 6 J a n -9 7 M a r -9 7 M a y -9 7 J u l -9 7 S e p -9 7 N o v -9 7 J a n -9 8 M a r -9 8 M a y -9 8 J u l -9 8 S e p -9 8 N o v -9 8 J a n -9 9 M a r -9 9 M a y -9 9 J u l -9 9 S e p -9 9 N o v -9 9 J a n - 
